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Case No. 20090793-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
VERBERY ADAMS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his conviction for one count of attempted murder with 
injury, a first degree felony in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-102(2)(a), 76-
5-203(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008). The Utah Supreme Court poured the case over to 
this Court, which has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) 
(West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. In a pretrial ruling before this bench trial, did the trial court abuse its 
discretion in ruling that evidence of Defendant's 1995 murder conviction for 
killing another with a car was admissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence? 
Standard of Review. This Court will "'review a trial court's decision to 
admit evidence under rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence under an abuse 
of discretion standard/" State v. Verde, 2010 UT App 30, | 14, 227 P.3d 840 
(quoting State v. Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, % 19, 219 R3d 75). "In doing so," this 
Court will "'review the record to determine whether the admission of other bad 
acts evidence was scrupulously examined by the trial judge in the proper 
exercise of that discretion/" Id. 
2. Did the trial court plainly err by allowing the State to introduce 
evidence of Defendant's prior conviction during its case-in-chief, when the 
pretrial rule 404(b) ruling admitting that evidence placed no conditions on when 
it could be admitted? 
Standard of Review. " T o prevail under plain error review, a defendant 
must demonstrate that [1] an error exists; [2] the error should have been obvious 
to the trial court; and [3] the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome/" State v. Kerr, 2010 UT App 
50, % 4, 228 P.3d 1255 (quoting State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, H 19-20, 192 P.3d 867) 
(alterations in original). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES 
Utah Rules of Evidence 402, 403, and 404, reproduced in Addendum A, are 
relevant to this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Defendant, Verbery Adams, with one count each of 
attempted murder with injury, a first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-203(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008), and attempted murder, a second degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (West Supp. 2008). R.l-3. 
Before trial, Adams requested notice of any evidence that the State intended to 
introduce pursuant to Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. R.12. Fifteen days 
before trial, the State provided written notice that it intended to introduce 
Adams7 1995 murder conviction "in order to establish knowledge, intent, and 
absence of mistake or accident in the event that Defendant testifies at the trial 
and puts his knowledge or intent at issue." R.40 (a copy of the State's notice is 
included in Addendum B). The notice included a certified copy of Adam's prior 
conviction. R.42-48 (a copy of the conviction is attached in Addendum C). The 
State provided a second copy of the conviction in a supplemental response to 
Adams' discovery request. R.50. The State also listed the prior conviction on its 
exhibit list. R.55. 
A bench trial was held. R.61-63, 85:1-253. Before trial, the parties argued 
the admissibility of Adams' prior conviction under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence. R.85:6-ll (a copy of the transcript of this argument, and the trial 
court's ruling, is included in Addendum D). The trial court ruled that while it 
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might not have admitted the evidence in a jury trial, the evidence would not be 
unfairly prejudicial in this bench trial. R.85:ll. 
During the State's case-in-chief, the investigating officer testified that 
Adams had admitted that, in 1995, he was convicted of murder in Illinois for 
killing someone with a car. R.85:8, 208. Defense counsel objected that the 
statement was hearsay and that "the State has other methods of introducing 
this." R.85:208. The prosecutor then moved to admit the certified copy of 
Adams' Illinois murder conviction. R.85:208-09 (copies of the these transcript 
pages are included in Addendum E). The trial court admitted the exhibit, 
explaining that it had already ruled that it was admissible. R.85:209. 
The trial court convicted Adams of attempted murder with injury, but 
acquitted him of attempted murder. R.85:248-50 (a copy of the trial court's 
explanation of its verdict is attached as Addendum F). The trial court sentenced 
Adams to serve three years to life in the Utah State Prison. R.73. Adams timely 
appealed. R.75. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
The fight 
The victim, Allan Saena, was attending a party at his cousin's West Valley 
apartment. R.85:103,159,170. Another of Allan's cousins —Gary Saena, attended 
the party with his fiance, Jennifer Tafi. R.85:22-24, 60, 160. Other cousins and 
friends were also there. R.85:22-24, 60, 160. As he arrived, Allan encountered 
Defendant, Verbery Adams, outside. R.85:160. Adams said something to Allan 
that Allan could not understand, but he suspected Adams "was maybe talking 
crap" to him. R.85:161. Allan disregarded Adams and continued on into his 
cousin's apartment. R.85:160. 
At the party, Allan became drunk and upset and decided to leave. 
R.85:161, 170. On the sidewalk outside the apartment, he encountered Adams 
talking to one of Allan's female cousins. R.85:161. Allan confronted Adams and 
their interaction quickly escalated into a fight. R.85:161. 
Allan threw the first punch. R.85:161. Many of the partygoers quickly 
joined the fight, some throwing punches, others trying to quell the melee. 
R.85:26-27,163. The fight lasted five to ten minutes. R.85:174. 
1
 The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the trial court's verdict. 
See State v. Nichols, 2003 UT App 287, 1f 1 n.l, 76 P.3d 1173 ("'On appeal from a 
bench trial, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
findings'" (quoting ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 250 n.l (Utah 
App. 1997)). 
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Adams hits Gaiy with his SUV and then runs over Allan 
Gary and Jennifer left the party as the fight ended, around 2:00 am. 
R.85:22, 25-26, 61, 63-64. As they crossed the street towards their car, Adams was 
driving towards them in his SUV, a BMW X5. R.85:34-35,111-12,165,182. When 
Gary was in front of Adams' SUV, Adams "gassed it." R.85:67. Gary jumped, 
trying to avoid being hit, but ended up rolling over the SUV's hood and 
bouncing off the driver's side windshield. R.85:68. Relatively unscathed, Gary 
chased after Adams. R.85:69. Others, including Allan, joined in the chase. 
R.85:29,165. 
Allan ran in front of Adams' SUV and pounded on the hood, trying to get 
Adams to stop. R.85:70, 165. Adams did not stop and ran Allan over. R.85:29-
30, 70,165. 
Adams runs over Allan again 
As Allan lay in the middle of the street, Gary ran to him and held him. 
R.85:72. Meanwhile, Adams circled around the apartment complex in his SUV. 
R.85:211. Gary then saw Adams' SUV coming back around the corner towards 
him and the injured Allan. R.85:73. Jennifer also saw Adams' SUV approaching 
again and yelled to Gary. R.85:30, 73. Gary tried to drag Allan out of Adams' 
path but he was too late. R.85:73. Adams ran over Allan again, driving over his 
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legs at about the knees. R.85:30, 73, 92. Both Gary and Jennifer saw Adams run 
over Allan the second time. Id. 
A security guard, Mike Salisbury, responded to a call about the fight and 
followed Adams as he drove around the complex the second time. R.85:142. 
Salisbury estimated that Adams was traveling thirty to forty miles an hour. 
R.85:146. From his position, Salisbury did not see Adams hit anyone, and he did 
not see Allan in the road as he passed. R.85:148, 150. However, he did notice 
several people yelling and pointing at Adams' SUV. R.85:144. Adams drove 
some distance past the group and stopped; Salisbury stopped in front of Adams. 
R.85:144. 
Adams flees 
Adams got out of his vehicle yelling that he had been assaulted. R.85:145. 
Salisbury directed Adams to stay by his vehicle while he talked to the party goers 
to find out what was going on. R.85:145. Instead, Adams drove away. R.85:145. 
Officer David Greco of the West Valley Police Department interviewed 
Adams later that day. R.85:207. Adams claimed that he had been assaulted and 
was being chased by a group of males as he attempted to leave in his vehicle. 
R.85:208, 211. He claimed that as he drove away he remembered that he had left 
his girlfriend behind, so he circled around the apartment complex. R.85:211, 213. 
Adams claimed that as he approached the area where the fight occurred, the 
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other males spotted him and started to approach him, so he continued on. 
R.85:213. Adams could then see police cars begin to enter the apartment 
complex. R.85:213. Adams explained that he spoke with the security guard, told 
him that he had been assaulted, and then left. R.85:213. He did not wait for the 
police, because he figured that there were enough witnesses to explain to police 
what had happened. R.85:214. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling before this 
bench trial that Adams7 prior murder conviction was admissible under rule 
404(b). The circumstances of the prior conviction were strikingly similar to the 
facts of this case —in both 1995 and 2008, Adams intentionally hit another person 
with his car as he fled from people who were pursuing him. The trial court 
admitted the prior conviction for the proper noncharacter purpose of rebutting 
Adams' claim that he lacked the requisite intent and knowledge in this case. 
Given the distinctive and strikingly similar circumstances of the two crimes, the 
prior conviction was relevant to these disputed issues even though it occurred 
fourteen years earlier. 
Additionally, because this was a bench trial, there was no risk that any 
unfair prejudice would outweigh the prior conviction's probative value. 
Concerns of unfair prejudice primarily arise in jury trials, not bench trials. 
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Regardless, the prior conviction did not unfairly prejudice Adams, because the 
trial court accorded limited weight to that evidence and acquitted Adams' on 
count two. 
In any event, any error in admitting the evidence was harmless because 
the prior conviction had little, if any, impact on the trial court's verdict. The 
prosecutor did not rely heavily on the prior conviction. The trial court gave the 
evidence little, if any, weight. Additionally, the judge's explanation of his 
verdict contains nothing that would support a conclusion that he relied on the 
prior conviction. The judge explained that he convicted Adams because he 
believed the State's witnesses who testified that they saw Adams twice run over 
Allan Saena. The judge also believed that Adams' flight was inconsistent with 
his claim of innocence. 
Point II. Adams demonstrates no error, let alone plain error, in the trial 
court's ruling allowing the State to introduce the prior conviction during its case-
in-chief. During the pretrial argument on the admissibility of the prior 
conviction under rule 404(b), the parties agreed that intent was at issue and 
defense counsel never argued that the evidence should be admissible only if he 
first testified. The trial court's pretrial ruling, therefore, placed no condition on 
when the State could introduce the evidence. Consequently, the trial court did 
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not err when it allowed the State to introduce the evidence during its case-in-
chief. 
Although Adams now claims that he was surprised when the State 
introduced his prior conviction during its case-in-chief, his actions at trial belie 
that claim. Defense counsel never claimed surprise below or requested a 
continuance. Rather, his comments suggest that he expected the State to 
introduce the evidence during its case-in-chief. In any event, Adams fails to 
demonstrate how the trial would have been different had he not been allegedly 
surprised. He also fails to demonstrate that his prior conviction influenced the 
verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
L ADAMS' PRIOR CONVICTION FOR INTENTIONALLY 
KILLING ANOTHER WITH HIS CAR WAS ADMISSIBLE 
UNDER RULE 404(B) FOR THE PROPER NONCHARACTER 
PURPOSE OF REBUTTING HIS CLAIM THAT HE LACKED 
THE REQUISITE INTENT AND KNOWLEDGE* 
Adams claims that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling pretrial 
that his prior murder conviction was admissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Appellant's Br. at 18-41. He claims that the evidence was not 
admitted for a proper, noncharacter purpose. Id. at 19-26. He asserts that 
although the State offered the evidence to prove that he acted intentionally, "the 
2
 This point responds to Adams' Point II. 
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only plausible theory for admission of Adams' prior conviction is to show the 
propensity to commit crime." Id. at 21. He also argues that the prior conviction 
was irrelevant because it had no logical connection to this case and was too 
remote in time. Id. at 27-30. He further asserts that the State presented 
insufficient detail about the prior conviction to show that it was relevant. Id. at 
30-32. Finally, Adams claims that the probative value of the evidence was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. 
However, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in ruling that 
Adams' prior conviction for intentionally killing another with his car was 
admissible. Adams' prior murder conviction was relevant to rebut his claim that 
he lacked intent and knowledge. Moreover, there was no danger of unfair 
prejudice because this was a bench trial, rather than a jury trial. In any event, 
any error in admitting the prior conviction was harmless because it does not 
appear that the trial court relied on that evidence in reaching its verdict. 
A. Evidence of other crimes is admissible under rule 404(b) to 
prove noncharacter purposes, such as intent, so long as the 
evidence's probative value is not substantially outweighed by 
any danger for unfair prejudice. 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, states: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
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Evidence of other bad acts is admissible under rule 404(b) if it meets a 
three-part test. State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, Tf f 18-20, 6 P.3d 1120 (citing 
State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f f 21-26, 993 P.2d 837); accord State v. Marchet, 2009 
UT App 205, f 29, 219 P.3d 75. First, the trial court must "determine whether the 
bad acts evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as 
one of those specifically listed in rule 404(b)." Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, | 18 . 
See also Marchet, 2009 UT App 205, % 29. 
If the evidence is offered for a proper noncharacter purpose, the court 
must then determine whether the bad acts evidence is admissible under rule 402. 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ^ 19. Under rule 402, "all relevant evidence is 
admissible except as otherwise provided in the rules." State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 
60, If 41, 28 P.3d 1278. See also Marchet, 2009 UT App 205, % 29. Relevant 
evidence is evidence "'having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that 
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence/" Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, 
Tf 19 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 401). Unless the evidence of the other bad act "tends 
to prove some fact that is material to the crime charged-other than the 
defendant's propensity to commit crime-it is irrelevant and should be excluded 
by the court pursuant to rule 402." Id. (citations omitted). See also Marchet, 2009 
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UT App 205, f 41. In other words, the evidence must be relevant to the issues in 
the case at hand. 
"Finally, the trial court must determine whether the other bad act evidence 
meets the requirements of rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." Nelson-
Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, f 20. See also Marchet, 2009 UT App 205, Tf 29. Rule 403 
excludes relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403. 
In sum, "evidence of prior misconduct is admissible under rule 404(b) if 
the evidence is relevant to a proper, non-character purpose, unless its danger for 
unfair prejudice and the like substantially outweighs its probative value." 
Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f^ 41. A trial court's decision to admit evidence under rule 
404(b) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Verde, 2010 UT App 30, \ 
14, 227 P.3d 840. 
B. Adams' prior murder conviction was offered for a relevant, 
noncharacter purpose — to prove his intent and knowledge. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion, because it admitted Adams' 
prior murder conviction for proper noncharacter purposes. 
To convict, the State had to prove that Adams intentionally attempted to 
kill Allan Saena by running him over with his SUV, and that Allan suffered 
13 
serious bodily injury. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-203(2)(a), 76-4-102(2)(a) 
(West Supp. 2008). 
Adams agreed that his intent was at issue. During the pretrial argument 
on the admissibility of the prior conviction, Adams' counsel acknowledged that 
"the whole issue in this case is one of intent/7 R.85:9. Defense counsel's opening 
statement put both Adams' knowledge and intent at issue. Counsel argued that 
while Adams admittedly ran over the victim, he was "not even aware of it." 
R.85:19. Counsel also argued that Adams lacked the intent to be guilty of 
attempted murder. He argued that while Adams may have acted recklessly in 
"trying to get away" from a situation "he did not initiate," Adams was not guilty 
of attempted murder. R.85:19. Counsel then reminded the trial court that "[t]he 
State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to do this." 
R.85:19. In his brief, Adams admits that "[t]he issue of intent was central to the 
outcome of the trial." Appellant's Br. at 15. 
The trial court properly recognized that the prior conviction was relevant 
for the proper, noncharacter purposes proffered by the State. In this case, Adams 
twice ran over Allan Saena as Allan pursued him following a fight. The 
circumstances of Adams' prior murder conviction were remarkably similar. In 
Chicago, Adams was in his car fleeing from gang members when he intentionally 
hit and killed one of them with his car. R.85:8, 9-10. In both instances, Adams 
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escaped what he perceived to be threatening situations by intentionally hitting 
others with his car. R.85:8, 9-10, 29-30, 70, 73, 92. 
The circumstances of both crimes are also distinctive. An individual does 
not usually run over another with a car, let alone do so intentionally. For that 
matter, an individual does not usually commit murder by running over the 
victim with a car. 
Adams asserts that "the only plausible theory for admission of Adams7 
prior conviction is to show the propensity to commit crime." Appellant's Br. at 
21. On the contrary, the fact that Adams had previously killed someone who 
was pursuing him by intentionally hitting the victim with a car was relevant and 
probative to rebut his claim that he lacked the requisite knowledge and intent in 
this case. In his closing argument, Adams7 counsel disputed Adams' knowledge, 
arguing that "it could be that Mr. Adams didn't know he ran over somebody[,]" 
because he could have believed that he was simply running over a speed bump. 
R.85:239-40. Counsel also argued that Adams lacked intent R.85:236. He 
argued, "[i]t might have been accidental. I think that it's likely that it was." Id. 
Counsel also asserted that if Adams had really intended to kill Allan, he would 
have taken better aim the second time, rather than just running over his legs. 
R.85:236-37. Counsel also argued that Adams was acting under extreme 
emotional distress. R.85:238-40. 
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Absent evidence of the prior conviction, Adams7 claim that he did not 
know that he ran over Allan, or that he was merely acting recklessly or under 
extreme emotional distress, was plausible. This is particularly true where 
Adams was fleeing from several individuals who had just beaten him up. 
R.85:29,161,165. The prior conviction, on the other hand, suggested that Adams 
would not be overwhelmed by the emotional nature of the situation and could 
act intentionally in facilitating an escape from his pursuers. 
Adams nevertheless contends that his prior conviction was irrelevant 
because it was too remote in time. Appellant's Br. at 28-30. The acts supporting 
Adams7 Illinois murder conviction occurred in the fall of 1994, fourteen years 
before his actions in this case. R.85:7, Exhibit 5 (Add. C). However, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the prior conviction was 
still relevant. 
"[Tjhe test for remoteness is not mechanical application/7 State v. 
Featiierson, 781 P.2d 424, 430 (Utah 1989), abrogated on oilier grounds by State v. 
Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 489 (Utah 1997). Rather, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether 
the other acts have 'clearly probative value with respect to the intent of the 
accused at the time of the offense cliarged.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Scott, 701 
F.2d 1340,1345-46 (11th Cir. 1983)) (emphasis in original). 
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As explained, the striking similarity between the two situations, and their 
distinctive circumstances, made Adams' prior conviction particularly probative 
of his intent in this case. Therefore, the prior conviction was not too remote. See 
id. 
Adams also contends that the State offered too little detail of the prior 
conviction to allow the trial court to determine its relevancy. Appellant's Br. at 
30-32. However, the details that the State provided were sufficient. The trial 
court knew that Adams was convicted of murder in Chicago for intentionally 
hitting and killing with his car a gang member who was pursuing him. R.85:8, 9-
10. The prosecutor also proffered that Adams had admitted to the investigating 
officer in this case that the two crimes were similar. R.85:8, 10. Adams did not 
dispute those facts. He only added that someone had threatened him with a 
firearm in the Chicago case. R.85:226. 
The trial court knew enough about the prior murder to properly determine 
that it was relevant. Given the striking similarities to the facts of this case, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the prior conviction to be 
relevant. 
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C The probative value of the prior similar conviction was not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of any unfair prejudice 
in this bench trial. 
The prior conviction also passes the third step under rule 403. Rule 403 
excludes relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence/' Utah R. Evid. 403. Adams argues that the probative 
value of his prior conviction was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice. Appellant's Br. at 32-35. 
However, the fact that this was a bench trial undermines Adams' claim 
that his prior conviction was unfairly prejudicial. "The evil that rule 403 is 
intended to combat, unfair prejudice, is primarily of concern during a jury trial." 
State v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North, Orem, 942 P.2d 925, 930 (Utah 1997). 
"The judge in a bench trial, . . . acting as a trier of fact, is presumably less likely 
than a jury to be prejudiced by evidence of prior crimes, wrongs of acts." State v. 
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989), abrogated on other grounds by State v. 
Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 489 (Utah 1997). "'[B]ecause it can be safely assumed that 
the trial court will be somewhat more discriminating in appraising both the 
competency and the effect properly to be given evidence, the rulings on evidence 
are looked upon with a greater degree of indulgence when the trial is to the court 
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than when it is to the jury/" Id. (quoting State v. Park, 404 P.2d 677, 679 (Utah 
1965)). 
The record demonstrates that the trial court was not prejudiced by Adams' 
prior conviction. The trial court indicated that it would give little weight to 
Adams' prior conviction. Each time the trial court addressed Adams' prior 
conviction it commented on the limited evidentiary value it was according it. 
During the pretrial argument on admissibility, the trial court commented that "it 
seems to me that really what counts in terms of his intent would be how he 
conducted himself in this case, not how he conducted himself in the case 14 years 
ago." R.85:ll. The judge then explained that although he was ruling that the 
prior conviction was admissible, his "real concern during the course of this trial 
is what transpired on October 4, 2008." Id. Later, when the prosecutor 
introduced the prior conviction during its case-in-chief, the judge commented 
that he was receiving it "to the extent it may or may not be helpful." R.85:209. 
These comments demonstrate that the trial court accorded the prior conviction 
little, if any, evidentiary weight. 
Additionally, the trial court's verdict demonstrates that it was not 
improperly influenced by the prior conviction. Although the trial court 
convicted Adams of count one for twice running over Allan Saena, it acquitted 
Adams of count two for hitting Gary Saena. Had the trial court been improperly 
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influenced by the prior conviction it likely would have convicted Adams on both 
counts. 
In any event, the probative value of Adams' prior conviction was not 
outweighed by the danger of any unfair prejudice in this bench trial. Some 
factors that may be considered in balancing whether the probative value of prior 
bad acts is substantially outweighed by their potential for unfair prejudice 
include: (1) the strength of the evidence that the defendant committed the other 
bad acts; (2) any similarities between the crimes; (3) the time interval between the 
two crimes; (4) the need for the bad acts evidence; (5) the efficacy of alternative 
proof, if any; and (6) the degree to which the evidence is likely to "rouse the jury 
to overmastering hostility." State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988). See 
also Marchet, 2009 UT App 205, t 44. 
In light of the so-called Shickles factors, any potential for unfair prejudice 
did not substantially outweigh the probative value of Adams' prior conviction. 
First, as Adams recognizes, the evidence that he committed the prior 
murder was strong because he was convicted of that crime. 
Second, as discussed above, the prior conviction's circumstances were 
strikingly similar to the charged crime and both crimes are distinctive. 
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Third, as also discussed above, the interval between the two crimes, while 
admittedly long, is not unduly remote given the similarities between the two 
crimes and their distinctive nature. 
Fourth, although the evidence was not crucial and the trial court accorded 
it little weight, it was nevertheless needed. As Adams' recognizes, the State had 
no direct evidence of his intent. Appellant's Br. at 15. The evidence was relevant 
to refute Adams' claims that he lacked knowledge that he ran over Allan, that he 
acted only recklessly, or that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional 
distress. Additionally, Adams argued that the State's witnesses were not 
credible in claiming that he ran over Allan twice. R.85:16, 232. Had the trial 
court not believed the State's witnesses on that point, the need for admission of 
the prior conviction would have increased. 
Finally, there was no concern that the prior conviction would arouse a jury 
to overmastering hostility, because this was a bench trial. 
In sum, while the probative value of the evidence, according to the trial 
court, was not great, the danger of unfair prejudice was low because this was a 
bench trial. See Featherson, 781 P.2d at 431 ("The judge in a bench trial,. . . acting 
as a trier of fact, is presumably less likely than a jury to be prejudiced by 
evidence of prior crimes, wrongs of acts.") The trial court, therefore, did not 
21 
abuse its discretion in determining that the danger of unfair prejudice did not 
substantially outweigh the probative value of the prior conviction. 
D. Any error was harmless because the prior conviction had little, 
if any, impact on the trial court's verdict. 
Even assuming that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling pretrial 
that the prior conviction was admissible, any error was harmless. This Court 
"'will not overturn a . . . verdict for the admission of improper evidence if the 
admission of the evidence did not reasonably [a]ffeet the likelihood of a different 
verdict/" State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, ^ 34,163 P.3d 695 (quoting State v. 
Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, ^ 26, 62 P.3d 444) (alteration by this Court). There was 
little likelihood of harm in this case because " [e]rroneous admissions of evidence 
are not as critical in a bench trial as where a jury is involved." State v. Rimmasch, 
775 P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 1989). Here, the record demonstrates that the prior 
conviction had little, if any, impact on the trial court's verdict. 
The prosecutor did not heavily rely on the prior conviction. She 
introduced a copy of the prior conviction during the direct examination of the 
investigating officer in this case. R.85:208-09; Exhibit 5 (Add. C). However, 
neither the prosecutor, nor the investigating officer, commented any further 
about the prior conviction. In fact, the prosecutor's next statement after 
introducing the prior conviction was "So we're not going to talk about that 
Chicago incident. Okay?" R.85:209. The prosecutor mentioned the prior 
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conviction only once during her closing argument. R.85:231. In one sentence she 
argued "[a]nd with the fact that' he was convicted of killing some guy by car in 
Chicago 15 years ago, 14 years ago, car is just the preferred weapon of this man." 
Id. 
Additionally, as explained above, the trial court indicated that it was 
giving little, if any, weight to Adams' prior conviction. 
Finally, nothing in the trial court's explanation of its verdict supports the 
conclusion that the judge relied on the prior conviction. The judge did not 
mention the prior conviction in explaining his verdict. R.85:245-53 (Add. F). 
Rather, he explained that he was finding Adams guilty of count one — attempted 
murder with injury of Allan Saena —for two reasons. First, the judge found 
Jennifer Tafi and Gary Saena to be "very credible" witnesses. R.85:246. Based on 
their testimony, the judge believed that Adams "came around twice" and hit 
Allan twice. Id. Second, the judge was persuaded by the fact that Adams fled 
after being told to remain, and after realizing that police were arriving. R.85:247-
48. The judge explained, "in my mind if [Adams] had an axe to grind with these 
people, and he had law enforcement there to back him up, it seems to me that he 
would have stuck around and told the police what had occurred." R.85:247. The 
judge continued, "[t]he second trip around, I believe that—I believe that Mr. 
Adams was upset enough and angry enough that he intended to kill this guy. 
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And I believe that beyond a reasonable doubt. I believe his intent was to do 
that." R.85:248. 
The judge acquitted Adams of count two, the attempted murder of Gary 
Saena. R.85:248-49. He found that the State had not met its burden on that count 
where the only evidence was that Gary jumped as Adams approached him in his 
SUV, and that Adams hit Gary with the hood and driver's side windshield. Id. 
Adams points to nothing in the trial court's verdict that would indicate 
that the judge relied on Adams' prior conviction in reaching its verdict. Rather, 
he asks this Court to assume that the prior conviction figured into the verdict 
because it was offered to prove intent—the central issue in the case. See 
Appellant's Br. at 15-18. He further asserts that "it must be assumed" that the 
trial court considered the prior conviction because it admitted evidence of the 
prior conviction. See Appellant's Br. at 39. 
But admitting evidence, and relying on that evidence to reach a verdict, are 
separate and distinguishable acts. This Court cannot assume that the trial court 
relied on the prior conviction simply because the trial court ruled that it was 
admissible. Rather, the judge, acting as fact finder, retained discretion to assign 
the prior conviction whatever weight he deemed appropriate, including no 
weight at all. See Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Gralwm, 2008 UT App 207, \ 
13, 186 P.3d 1012 (recognizing that in a bench trial it is the trial court's role to 
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determine the proper weight to be given the evidence); Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson, 
448 P.2d 709, 712 (Utah 1968) (a "fact-trier . . . is not bound to slavishly follow the 
evidence" and has the "prerogative to place his own appraisal upon the 
evidence"). 
The trial court convicted Adams on count one because it believed the 
State's witness's testimony that he ran over Allan twice, and because Adams 
flight was inconsistent with his claim that he had not run over Allan 
intentionally. R.85:245-49 (Add. F). The judge believed that Adams' prior 
conviction carried little evidentiary weight and nothing in its verdict 
demonstrates that it relied on the prior conviction. Therefore, any error in 
admitting the prior conviction was harmless. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN ADMITTING 
EVIDENCE OF ADAMS' PRIOR CONVICTION DURING THE 
STATE'S CASE-IN-CHIEF, BECAUSE THE PRETRIAL RULING 
ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE PLACED NO CONDITION ON 
WHEN IT COULD BE ADMITTED; REGARDLESS, ADAMS 
FAILS TO SHOW THAT ANY ERROR HARMED HIM3 
Adams claims that the trial court plainly erred when it admitted his prior 
conviction during the State's case-in-chief because his testimony was a condition 
precedent to the introduction of his prior conviction. Appellant's Br. at 8-18. 
However, Adams cannot demonstrate any error, let alone plain error, because 
the trial court's pretrial ruling admitting his prior conviction placed no condition 
3
 This point responds to Adams' Point I. 
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on when that evidence could be admitted. R.85:10-ll (Add. D). In any event, 
Adams cannot demonstrate that he was unfairly surprised by the admission of 
his prior conviction, or that admission of the evidence harmed him. 
Below, Adams did not claim that he was surprised by the introduction of 
his prior conviction during the State's case-in-chief, nor did he ever argue that 
the prior conviction could not be introduced unless he first testified. R.85:6-ll, 
208-09 (Add. D & E). He therefore argues on appeal that the trial court plainly 
erred in allowing the State to introduce his prior conviction in its case-in-chief. 
Appellant's Br. at 14-18. 
"To prevail under plain error review, a defendant must demonstrate that 
[1] an error exists; [2] the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 
[3] the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome/" State v. Kerr, 2010 UT App 50, \ 4, 228 P.3d 1255 
(quoting State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, I f 19-20,192 P.3d 867) (alterations in original). 
A. Factual background. 
In a pretrial discovery request, Adams requested notice of any evidence 
the State planned to introduce under rule 404(b). R.12. In response, the State 
provided Adams written notice that it intended to introduce his prior conviction 
for murder in Illinois. R.40 (Add. B). The notice was delivered fifteen days 
before trial and explained that the State would introduce the prior conviction "to 
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establish knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake or accident in the event that 
Defendant testifies at the trial and puts his knowledge or intent at issue." R.40. 
Before the bench trial began, the parties argued the admissibility of 
Adams' prior conviction under Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. R.85:6-ll 
(Add. D). Adams' counsel argued that the prior conviction was inadmissible 
under the rule. R.85:8-10. However, he acknowledged that "the whole issue in 
this case is one of intent." R.85:9. Defense counsel never argued that, based on 
the prosecutor's notice, the prior conviction should only be admitted if he first 
testified. Id. In fact, defense counsel never mentioned the State's rule 404(b) 
notice. Id. 
After hearing from both counsel, the trial court ruled that the prior 
conviction was admissible at trial. R.85:ll. The judge explained that while he 
"probably wouldn't allow" the evidence to be admitted in a jury trial, he would 
in this bench trial. Id. The ruling placed no condition on when the prior 
conviction could be admitted. Id. 
During the State's case-in-chief, the investigating officer testified that 
Adams "mentioned that he had a previous incident back in 1995 where he hit 
someone." R.85:208. Defense counsel objected that the statement was hearsay 
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and that the State had ''other methods" for introducing the evidence.4 R.85:208. 
The State then moved to admit the evidence of Adams' prior murder conviction. 
R.85:208-09. The trial court overruled the hearsay objection and admitted Exhibit 
5, a copy of Adams' prior conviction, noting that it had ruled pretrial that the 
evidence was admissible. R.85:209. Defense counsel did not object to the 
admission of the prior conviction on the grounds that he was surprised. 
R.85:208-09. Nor did he request a continuance to be able to prepare to address 
the evidence. Id. 
B. Adams demonstrates no error in the trial court's ruling 
admitting the prior conviction during the State's case-in-chief. 
Adams' plain error claim fails because he demonstrates no error in the trial 
court's ruling admitting the prior conviction during the State's case-in-chief. He 
argues that this ruling was erroneous because the trial court's pretrial ruling 
allowed his prior conviction "to be introduced only in the event that Adams 
testified/' Appellant's Br. at 11 (emphasis in original). Adams misrepresents the 
record. The pretrial ruling on admissibility placed no condition on when the 
prior conviction could be introduced. R.85:ll (Add. D). 
The prosecutor's pretrial notice said that she intended to introduce the 
prior conviction "in the event that Defendant testifies at the trial and puts his 
4
 The statement was not hearsay because it was an admission of a party-
opponent. Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2). 
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knowledge or intent at issue/' R.40. But defense counsel never argued that 
Adams7 testimony should be a condition precedent to the introduction of his 
prior conviction. R.85:6-ll (Add. D). If defense counsel believed that the State's 
notice made his testimony a condition precedent to the admission of his prior 
conviction then it was incumbent upon him to say so during the pretrial 
argument on the admissibility of the evidence. His silence waived any claim that 
his testimony was a condition precedent to the admission of his prior conviction. 
This is especially true where Adams conceded during the pretrial evidentiary 
hearing that intent was at issue. Because the pretrial ruling admitted the prior 
conviction unconditionally, Adams cannot demonstrate any error in the mid-trial 
ruling allowing the State to introduce the prior conviction in its case-in-chief. 
C. The State provided reasonable notice of its intent to introduce 
the prior conviction. 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, required the prosecutor to provide 
Adams "reasonable notice" of her intent to introduce the prior conviction. See 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). The State's notice satisfied the purposes of Rule 404(b)'s 
notice provision. 
Utah courts have yet to decide what constitutes "reasonable notice" under 
Rule 404(b). Adams therefore relies on the advisory committee notes to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, which explain that the notice provision in federal Rule 
404(b) is intended "'to [1] reduce surprise and [2] promote early resolution on the 
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issue of admissibility.'" Appellant's Br. at 11 (quoting United States v. Carrasco, 
381 F.3d 1237,1241 (11th Cir. 2004) (in turn quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) advisory 
committee's note (1991))). The State's notice satisfied both of these purposes. 
First, the notice allowed the trial court to resolve admissibility questions 
early. The parties argued and the trial court resolved the admissibility of 
Adams' prior conviction under rule 404(b) before the bench trial began. R.85:6-
11 (Add. D). 
Second, the notice alerted Adams that the prosecutor intended to 
introduce his prior conviction if he put his knowledge or intent at issue. R.40 
(Add. B). Adams does not dispute that he put his intent at issue. See Appellant's 
Br. at 15 (explaining that intent was "the heard of Adams' defense" and "central 
to the outcome of the trial"). Moreover, as explained, the trial court placed no 
conditions on the State's introduction of the prior conviction. Therefore, Adams 
could not have been truly surprised when the prosecutor introduced his prior 
conviction. 
Although Adams now claims that he was, in fact, surprised because the 
prosecutor introduced the prior conviction during the State's case-in-chief, 
Adams' actions at trial belie his belated claim of surprise. Adams' counsel's 
failure to claim surprise or to request a continuance when the State introduced 
the prior conviction demonstrates that the evidence did not, in fact, surprise him. 
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Defense counsel never objected that the evidence could only be admitted if he 
first testified, that he received inadequate or otherwise deficient notice, or that 
the evidence otherwise surprised him. R.85:208-09. Rather, in objecting to the 
officer's alleged hearsay, defense counsel commented that "the State has other 
methods of introducing" the evidence. R.85:208. This comment suggests that 
counsel anticipated that the State would introduce the evidence in its case-in-
chief. Moreover, when the prosecutor then introduced Exhibit 5, the copy of the 
prior conviction, defense counsel did not object. R.85:208-09. Given his counsel's 
failure to claim surprise below, Adams' belated claim of surprise lacks merit. 
D. Adams fails to demonstrate that any error was harmful. 
In any event, Adams cannot demonstrate that he was harmed by the 
admission of his prior conviction. He does not detail what he would have done 
differently to address his prior conviction. Nor can he demonstrate that his prior 
conviction influenced the trial court's verdict. 
Adams fails to specifically demonstrate how his trial would have 
proceeded any differently had he not been allegedly surprised by the 
introduction of his prior conviction during the State's case-in-chief. He claims 
generally that he was not prepared to testify about his prior murder conviction 
and was not able to investigate it, or prepare his own witnesses to explain it or 
distinguish it from the circumstances of the present case. Appellant's Br. at 12-
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13,15. However, Adams fails to detail the specific testimony that he would have 
offered had he known that the evidence would be admitted in the State's case-in-
chief. See id. He also fails to explain why he would not have known enough 
about his own prior murder conviction to be able to address it through his own 
testimony. Absent the specific details of the additional evidence or testimony he 
would have introduced, Adams' claim of harm is merely speculative. Cf. State v. 
Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) (holding that an "invitation to speculate" 
about the impact of unspecified testimony "cannot substitute for proof of 
prejudice" in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 
In any event, as explained above, Adams cannot demonstrate that his prior 
conviction played any part in the trial court's verdict. See Point I.D, supra. 
Therefore, Adams cannot demonstrate that he was harmed by any error in 
admitting his prior conviction. 
Adams argues that "this case warrants a shift of the burden to the State to 
persuade this Court that the error was harmless." Appellant's Br. at 16. For 
support, he relies on two cases, State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), and State 
v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100 (Utah 1988). Id. at 16-17. However, neither Knight nor Bell 
was a plain error case. Rather, they addressed preserved challenges to the State's 
failure to give proper notice of evidence in discovery (Knight) or proper notice of 
the charge (Bell). See Knight, 734 P.2d at 916; Bell 770 P.2d at 104-08. Because 
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Adams must demonstrate plain error, he bears the burden of proving all three 
components of a plain error claim, including harm. See, e.g., State v. Weaver, 2005 
UT 49,Tf 18, 122 P.3d 566 (imposing burden of establishing plain error or 
exceptional circumstances on appellant); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 
1993) (same). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 13 September 2010. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence 
inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, 
or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence 
which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, 
or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; 
other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(a)(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of 
character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and 
admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the 
accused offered by the prosecution; 
(a)(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim 
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged 
victim was the first aggressor; 
(a)(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in 
Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the 
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, 
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the 
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
(c) Evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases. 
(c)(1) In a criminal case in which the accused is charged with child molestation, 
evidence of the commission of other acts of child molestation may be admissible 
to prove a propensity to commit the crime charged provided that the prosecution 
in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during 
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any 
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
(c)(2) For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed in 
relation to a child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this state, be 
a sexual offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense. 
(c)(3) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise 
admissible under Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence. 
Addendum B 
LOHRA L. MILLER 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
CHOU CHOU COLLINS, Bar No. 6081 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
VERBERY ADAMS, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S NOTICE OF INTENT TO OFFER 
EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 404 
Case No. 081907684 
Judge WILLIAM BARRETT 
The State of Utah, through its attorney, CHOU CHOU COLLINS, Deputy District 
Attorney, hereby provides notice pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence 404, of the State's 
intent to introduce other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence at trial. The State intends to 
introduce Defendant's 1995 Murder conviction in the State of Illinois (Exhibit A) in 
order to establish knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake or accident in the event that 
Defendant testifies at the trial and puts his knowledge or intent at issue. Defendant, on 
October 4, 2008, informed Detective Greco of West Valley City Police department that, 
in 1995, he was convicted of Murder in Chicago for killing someone with a car. 
DATED this 10th day of June, 2009. 
CHOU CHOU COLLINS 
Deputy District Attorney 
*: so A:; r:i-,7 
p n n J ^ ! ! \ ! / ^ 
Addendum C 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS Page 001 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
VS NUMBER 94CR2665101 
VERBERY ADAMS 
CERTIFIED STATEMENT OF CONVICTION / DISPOSITION 
I, DOROTHY BROWN, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 
id keeper of the records and seal thereof do hereby certify that the 
ectronic records of the Circuit Court of Cook County show that: 
ie States Attorney of Cook County filed an INDICTMENT/INFORMATION 
th the Clerk of the Circuit Court. 
arging the above named defendant with: 
720-5/9-1(A)(1) F M MURDER/INTENT TO KILL/INJ 
720-5/9-1(A)(2) F M MURDER/STRONG PROB KILL/I 
e following disposition(s) was/were rendered before the Honorable Judge(s): 
/04/94 IND/INFO-CLK OFFICE-PRES JUDGE 11/16/94 1701 
94CR2665101 ID# CR100720134 
/16/94 CASE ASSIGNED 11/16/94 1714 
FITZGERALD, THOMAS R. 
/16/94 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/16/94 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/16/94 APPEARANCE FILED 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/16/94 DEFENDANT ARRAIGNED 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/16/94 PLEA OF NOT GUILTY 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/16/94 ADMONISH AS TO TRIAL IN ABSENT 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/16/94 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT 12/01/94 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
'01/94 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
'01/94 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
'01/94 MOTION DEFT - CONTINUANCE - MD 01/05/95 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
'0 8/94 MOTION FOR BAIL REDUCTION E 2 
'08/94 NOTICE OF MOTION/FILING 12/12/94 1714 
'13/94 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS Page 002 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
VS NUMBER 94CR2665101 
VERBERY ADAMS 
CERTIFIED STATEMENT OF CONVICTION / DISPOSITION 
I, DOROTHY BROWN, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 
d keeper of the records and seal thereof do hereby certify that the 
ectronic records of the Circuit Court of Cook County show that: 
e States Attorney of Cook County filed an INDICTMENT/INFORMATION 
/13/94 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/13/94 MOTION FOR BAIL REDUCTION S 2 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/13/94 BAIL AMOUNT SET $ 65000 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/13/94 O/C ONLY REL DEF ON D BOND $ 65000 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/13/94 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT 01/05/95 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/05/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/05/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/05/95 MOTION DEFT - CONTINUANCE - MD 01/30/95 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/09/95 MOTION TO ADVANCE E 2 
/09/95 NOTICE OF MOTION/FILING 01/11/95 1714 
/11/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/11/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/11/95 MOTION FOR DISCOVERY E 1 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/11/95 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT 02/07/95 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
./30/95 CASE ADVANCED 01/30/95 1714 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
./3 0/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
./30/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
./3 0/95 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT 02/07/95 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
>/07/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
1/01/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
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BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
./16/95 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT 04/03/95 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/03/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/03/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/03/95 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT 05/03/95 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
»/03/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
./03/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
./03/95 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT 05/15/95 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
./15/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
I/15/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/15/95 CONTINUANCE BY AGREEMENT 06/13/95 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/13/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/13/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/13/95 DEF DEMAND FOR TRIAL 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/13/95 MOTION STATE - CONTINUANCE -MS 07/05/95 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/05/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
/05/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
BERKOS, CHRISTY S. 
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/17/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/17/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/17/95 MOTION STATE - CONTINUANCE -MS 07/24/95 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/24/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/24/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/24/95 PG JW FINDING GUILTY CALL 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/24/95 CONTINUANCE BY ORDER OF COURT 07/25/95 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/25/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/25/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/25/95 CONTINUANCE BY ORDER OF COURT 07/26/95 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/26/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/26/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/26/95 CONTINUED JURY TRIAL 07/27/95 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/2 7/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/27/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/27/95 CONTINUANCE BY ORDER OF COURT 07/28/95 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/2 8/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
PORTER DENNIS J 
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PORTER DENNIS J 
/06/95 MOTION DEFT - CONTINUANCE - MD 09/11/95 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/11/95 DEFENDANT IN CUSTODY 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/11/95 PRISONER DATA SHEET TO ISSUE 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/11/95 MOTION DEFENDANT - NEW TRIAL D 2 
PORTER DENNIS J 
/11/95 DEF SENTENCED ILLINOIS DOC C002 
9 YRS 
PORTER DENNIS J 
'11/95 CREDIT DEFENDANT FOR TIME SERV 
337 DAYS 
PORTER DENNIS J 
'11/95 DEF ADVISED OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
PORTER DENNIS J 
'11/95 ILL STATE APPELLATE DEF APPTD 
PORTER DENNIS J 
'11/95 LET MITTIMUS ISSUE/MITT TO ISS 
PORTER DENNIS J 
'05/95 NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED, TRNSFR 
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iROTHY BROWN 7^T 
JCAJJU. >_.. *•— )X± .iW -
K OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY 
Addendum D 
June 25, 2009 
PROCEEDINGS 
* * * 
THE COURT: This is State of Utah vs. Verbery Adams, 
Case No. 081907684. May I have appearances, please. 
MR. MACK: David Mack for Mr. Adams. 
MS. COLLINS: Chou Chou Collins for the State. 
THE COURT: 1WhatTs your pleasure? Do you want 
opening statements? 
MR. MACK: We do, yes, Judge, but I think the State 
has a motion. 
THE COURT: ThatTs right. We need to hear the 404(b) 
motion. 
MR. MACK: May Mr. Adams have a hand free so he 
may — 
THE COURT: He canft have a hand free, but he can — 
THE BAILIFF: I'll move his hands. 
THE COURT: — have them handcuffed in front of him. 
Okay. We have this Rule 404(b) motion, Ms. Collins. 
MS. COLLINS: Yes, your Honor. I have this — before 
we start, I have this witness list and exhibit list. Would the 
court like to have my original? 
THE COURT: Sure. You can bring those up if you 
would like. Thanks. 
MS. COLLINS: And I have given a copy to the court 
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reporter. And then I also marked exhibits according to that 
number. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. COLLINS: And we have stipulation on the exhibit 
No. 5 which we are going to argue right now. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
MS. COLLINS: Your Honor, the test, of course, of 
that it's a conviction older than 10 years, as the court can 
see. And the test of that is 404(b) . And the standard on 
that, thereTs a three-step test as the court knows. 
The first step is if it was a character evidence. In 
this case it's not. 
The second step it is relevant, yes, it is relevant 
because the issue here we're trying to decide today is if 
defendant intentionally ran over those two people. And so that 
directly goes into the issue here for this prior conviction 
because that's what he did back in 1995 and '94. I can't 
remember which year. 
THE COURT: It was '94 when I looked at the 
information you provided. 
MS. COLLINS: Okay. It's '94. Thank you. 
And then the third part is that, then, is the 
weighing test, the probative versus prejudicial. And I think 
in this case it's definitely probative in this case because, 
and this shows, and like the 404 (b) indicator shows lack of 
7 
accident, lack of mistake, shows almost every single one listed 
in 404(b) , it basically says, "To prove the motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, planned knowledge, identity 
and absent of mistake or accident." 
So, your Honor, all three tests, three steps were 
satisfied based on the facts situation, based on the prior 
conviction. We believe that should be allowed. And the 
defendant already made a statement to the Detective Greco from 
West Valley City who's going to testify today also that October 
is a bad month because 15 years ago he was convicted of the 
same kind of crime, and he did four years for doing that. And 
he hit somebody with a car and he killed that person in Chicago 
and because those people are coming after him, those gang 
members were coming after him. A lot like the case today in so 
many aspects on so many levels, and we believe that should be 
allowed. 
THE COURT: Mr. Mack. 
MR. MACK: Well, your Honor, I think that — well, 
first of all, there is the prior conviction. And there are the 
statements by Mr. Adams to the officer, but I don't agree that 
— I mean, I still think it!s far more prejudicial than 
probative in this case. That, I guess if you take the 
statements Ms. Collins has alluded to for Mr. Adams to the 
officer, he intentionally ran this person over and intended to 
kill him. That's — those are his words to the officer. 
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I think the issue here, and the State's kind of 
glossing over that that's — therefore, it should come in 
because it's intent, knowledge, preparation, absence of 
mistake, the whole idea of this case, the whole issue in this 
case is one of intent. 
We don't have the evidence of that yet. I think that 
it's highly, highly prejudicial to say, you know, to compare 
those two things, one where there's conviction and one alleged, 
not proven, and say that they happened and unfolded pretty much 
the same way, that this is how he operates, when he's in 
trouble, he runs people over. I mean, that's what they are 
asking, and I think that goes to character. 
It's not a plan. It's not —• I mean, you know, 
something about the case, I think, from prior discussions, but 
this whole incident at issue today is the result of Mr. Adams' 
actions in extricating himself from a fight where he was laid 
upon by several people, a varying number of people and tried to 
get away. And that's — there's nothing in his statement to 
the officer that he saw these people and thought he had to hit 
them, thought he should run them over to save his life. 
There's nothing of that. In fact, there won't be anything like 
that. 
It's a completely different burden. It's similar 
because there's a car, because there's an injury. It's 
dissimilar because the other one was a death and there was an 
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intentional, the statement by him was intentional. 
I think it's — I don't think it would be the kind of 
evidence that would be allowed to be heard by a jury or 
considered. I think it's just so highly prejudicial. 
In fact, there's Utah case State vs. Schickles that 
deals with some admissibility issues under 404(b) . And it's — 
there's a line in there, I may not have it exactly correct, but 
that it's — there's too much, there's too much information 
here. Yes, there are same similarities, but it clouds the 
issue. 
And the State, if they brought some details, maybe a 
factual summary of the other case or something else that would 
show, you know, more similarities than what's at issue here, 
then maybe, but I think it's presumptively inadmissible. And I 
don't think they've surmounted enough of the obstacles here to 
have it be before this court. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, go ahead. 
MS. COLLINS: Your Honor, I just want to quickly 
address, I believe in the interview defendant did say 14 years 
later the same thing. So in his mind he was thinking is the 
same thing, happened again as though he did it, one, and he did 
it before. And based — 
THE COURT: Now, I think — I understand that that's 
where you are coming from. 14 years ago he engaged in the same 
kind of conduct as alleged in the cases before me today, but on 
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the other hand, it seems to me that really what counts in terms 
of his intent would be how he conducted himself in this case, 
not how he conducted himself in the case 14 years ago. 
MS. COLLINS: Your Honor, that's true. However, 
according to 403 is the weighing test, that the probative value 
has to be substantially outweighed for the prejudicial — 
THE COURT: ITm not sure in my mind that it would be 
prejudicial in terms of my being the judge in this case. With 
the jury I probably wouldn't allow it. I think because — 
because I?m sitting here, and Ifm going to be the finder of 
fact, I!m going to grant your motion and allow the information 
to came in on the prior conduct. But I want to assure 
everybody that my real concern during the course of this trial 
is what transpired on October 4, 2008. Okay? 
MR. MACK: All right. 
THE COURT: Let!s go. 
MS. COLLINS: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you want to do an opening statement 
or — 
MR. MACK: I do. 
MS. COLLINS: You do? Then I better do it then. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. COLLINS: Your Honor, this incident happened on 
October 4th first thing in the morning, 2008, last year. 
THE COURT: Was it October 4? 
Addendum E 
A. I observed that he had, I believe his upper right lip 
was swollen during the interview. And I noticed that. I 
didn't observe any other injuries on him. He did complain of 
some soreness in his rib cage. And I looked, but I didn't see 
anything, anything that stood out. 
Q. Is there anything significant that he told you during 
the interview, without going through the details of everything? 
A. Yes. He mentioned that he was driving the vehicle. 
He indicated that he had been assaulted during a fight that had 
taken place at the Shadowbrook Apartments. He went into the 
details on kind of what led up to the — when the assault took 
place. And that he had gotten into his vehicle to try to leave 
the area and stated that he was — he didn't think he hit 
anybody, but that he was confused from the assault. He then 
mentioned that he had a previous incident back in 1995 where he 
had hit someone. 
MR. MACK: Judge, I object to this. I think the 
State has other methods of introducing this. This is hearsay. 
I don't know — I don't know if there's an exception to it. I 
don't think. 
MS. COLLINS: It's a statement against interest. 
Your Honor, at this point, the State offers State's Exhibit 
No. 5, which is a certificate of Cook County Illinois, People 
of the State of Illinois vs. Verbery Adams. It's a certified 
statement of conviction/disposition, Case No. 94CR2665101 where 
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defendant was convicted murder/intent to kill/injury. 
THE COURT: Okay. Ifm going to overrule your 
objection. Ifve already told her that I will allow Exhibit 5. 
So it will be received. Are you offering it? 
MS. COLLINS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Five is received to the extent it may or 
may not be helpful. 
(State's Exhibit No. 5 
Was received into evidence.; 
Q. (BY MS. COLLINS) So we're not going to talk about 
that Chicago incident. Okay? 
A. Okay. 
Q. So we're talking about what happened. So did 
defendant tell you why he was at that Shadowbrook Apartment 
complex that night? 
A. Yes. He was hanging out with two individuals that he 
had just recently met, kind of having a party at their 
residence. And he was there for a little while before leaving, 
attempting to leave. 
Q. Did he tell you how often he goes there? 
A. I believe he mentioned that he'd gone there a couple 
of times. These were people he recently met. 
Q. I'm going to ask you about your interview with Ula. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Okay? Do you remember the interview with Ula? 
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Addendum F 
Addendum F 
Addendum F 
So he was assaulted by that group. He put in that 
point, made it sound like he was defending himself. And he was 
trying to leave, which probably was partially true. But then 
when the security person says, "You stay there. ITm going to 
go check this out." He took off. Why? He was fleeing from 
the scene because he didn't want to have to face the police and 
the security people because if he knew what he did. It's the 
guilt conscience right there. And that's what he did. 
And he knew plainly what he was doing at that point. 
He ran over the guy twice. We're lucky we're here today. The 
guy survived. And he hit Gary when he was trying to hit Gary, 
trying to run over him with the big X5. That's the intent 
right there. 
So we believe that intent is demonstrated by the 
testimony, by the event of what happened, laid out by all the 
witnesses here, by the circumstances, by the map, the court can 
see, and we believe intent was demonstrated by that. 
THE COURT: Well, it's interesting that we perceive 
things differently, but let me tell you what my take is on this 
thing. 
I thought that Jennifer Tafi, I think her last name 
was, was very credible. I'm clear about that. And I realize 
that under circumstances like this, people's perceptions 
certainly do vary. But I felt that she was credible. And I 
believe based upon her testimony, and Gary's also, when he was 
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describing how he was holding his cousin in the street, he 
could hear somebody screaming, the car was coming again, and he 
was trying to drag him off, I felt there was credibility there. 
I felt a little hostility, obviously, while he was testifying. 
I don't know what that's all about. Maybe he just doesn't like 
police and other things that goes on, who knows, but that's not 
the point. 
So those two were very credible to me. And I believe 
that the evidence supports a finding beyond a reasonable doubt 
that that occurred, he came around twice. 
Now I'm going to go a little bit farther with this. 
I know that Mr. Mack made a big issue out of a variety of 
things, one of them which was the security guard. And 
believing — the security guard had no reason to tell me a 
story, I don't think. I think he was just telling what he 
recalled. 
And what sticks in my mind are a couple of things. 
Mr. Salisbury receives the call. He comes back to the 
Shadowbrook Apartments. He pulls into the main drive. He sees 
this SUV coming at him, who then makes a quick turn around and 
takes off, and he follows him. And he's following, he says 
three to four feet. Well, that's pretty close when he says 
they are going 30 to 40 miles an hour. But there's no doubt in 
my mind that he followed this vehicle. Whether he was three to 
four feet, who knows. Not that that's a real issue, but the 
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speed is certainly significant. 
And if I take that testimony, and I take a look at 
the testimony of Detective Greco about what Mr. Adams told him, 
that he had come around, he was going out, he decided that he 
had to pick up his girlfriend, which he doesn't seem to make a 
whole big effort in doing so, and he comes back around. And 
then when he arrives at that point where he pulls down that 
little alley after passing the place where the speed bump was, 
he stopped, but I think he stopped because the security guard 
blocked him off. 
And that's when he got out and spoke to the security 
guard about being in this fight; being assaulted. 
And the interesting thing to me is, if I had been 
assaulted, I would imagine I'd be angry. I'd be really upset, 
particularly when there's more than one person, so you are 
really at a disadvantage. 
So I can see Mr. Adams was probably angry, really 
upset, and he knew he did something wrong. And I think he — 
well, I'll get to that in a minute. And then he left when he 
was told to remain. 
And in my mind if he had an axe to grind with these 
people, and he had law enforcement there to back him up, it 
seems to me that he would have stuck around and told the police 
what had occurred. And you can't tell me that he didn't know 
that he ran over this fellow. I don't care if he went over a 
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speed bump after he hit him the first time, he knew. 
Now we — and so I hear this story. I hear this 
story from the detective, and from the security guy. I'm 
thinking, hmm, that seems a little bit odd to me. 
The second trip around, I believe that — I believe 
that Mr. Adams was upset enough and angry enough that he 
intended to kill this guy. And I believe that beyond a 
reasonable doubt. I believe his intent was to do that. 
And I think I've kind of gone over the reasons why I 
believe that. I think people view things differently. People 
act differently. I can — Ula, why she said what she said and 
why she got involved in telling a story that didn't make a 
whole lot of sense when she sat here in court and told a 
different story, and then couldn't remember what she told the 
detective, you know, that's too bad. But I think there's 
sufficient evidence that rises to the level that I believe 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he attempted to kill the victim 
in this case. So I'm going to find him guilty of Count I. 
With respect to Count II, I think that's a little 
fuzzy. He may have been hit by the mirror. That's what was 
reported first. Now the story I hear today is that he jumped 
up in the air and he was hit by the driver's side windshield. 
And I don't recall whether it was a left or right side, but I 
don't think that's — I don't think that's significant enough. 
And I do not feel that the State's met its burden on that 
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charge, and that charge is dismissed. 
MR. MACK: Your Honor, could I ask for just same 
clarification? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. MACK: Still wondering about how this subsection 
4 might apply. Itfs still intentional. Attempted, it's an 
affirmative defense to an attempted murder that someone causes 
or attempts to cause the death of another under the influence 
of extreme emotional distress or — 
THE COURT: Well, I don!t have any evidence that he 
was under extreme emotional distress. 
MR. MACK: Well, it seems maybe I misunderstood your 
statements that he was very, very — 
THE COURT: Angry. 
MR. MACK: — angry. 
THE COURT: I don't know that's extreme emotional 
distress, though. 
MR. MACK: Okay. 
THE COURT: That's my view. I see a distinction 
between anger, being mad at people who just assaulted him and 
being so upset he doesn't know what's going on. I don't buy 
that. 
MR. MACK: Well, I'm not sure that that's what it 
calls for. If someone is angry about being assaulted by a 
group that outnumbers them, and there's still some of them 
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around — 
THE COURT: If you can give me some cases that would 
explain otherwise, but if that were the case, he should have 
gotten out of town. He should have just left. He didn't. 
MR. MACK: Well, but that's ~ that's not ~ the 
statute doesn't contemplate not leaving because it sometimes — 
THE COURT: It gives him the right to came back 
around and run over this guy again? 
MR. MACK: No, I'm not saying it does, your Honor. 
I'm just thinking, I'm just arguing that that, that that, that 
what the Court has stated about his being upset and knowing 
that there's still some people around that were part of this 
assault on him, it's not enough to be a complete affirmative 
defense, assaultive defense. But I think it fits in the — it 
fits into — 
THE COURT: I see a distinction, I truly do, between 
extreme emotional distress and the opportunity to leave and the 
failure to do so. I mean, I can see a distinction there. 
MR. MACK: And I don't know — and I'm not going to 
persuade — 
THE COURT: Let's put it this way. Let's say that he 
did it. He ran over him the first time and then he threw it in 
reverse and backed up. 
MR. MACK: Yeah. 
THE COURT: I could buy, I think, extreme emotional 
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distress because you are looking at that kind of conduct and 
wondering what in the world is going on. But he drives out, 
he's going to exit, and then he comes back around, he tells 
some story about picking up his girlfriend, and he doesn't pick 
lip his girlfriend. And then he comes back through again — 
MR. MACK: Right, but that's — 
THE COURT: I see a distinction. 
MR. MACK: And I'm not — if I could say a couple of 
things. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
MR. MACK: "When he comes back around, the same people 
are still there and they were in pursuant. 
THE COURT: What's he doing there? See. 
MR. MACK: I don't know. 
THE COURT: And the distinction I see is extreme 
emotional distress where one thing occurs, and then all of a 
sudden something else occurs, a negative thing, within moments, 
within moments, not within four, five minutes or 10 minutes or 
however long it may have transpired. 
MR. MACK: And I don't know that's — that anyone 
suggested it was that length of time. They said it happened so 
fast they couldn't get the guy out of the way. 
THE COURT: Well, and that's true. But his story was 
so different. I mean, he didn't — his story was I'm looking 
for my girlfriend. And I pull around and I pull in this one 
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area, and then I come back. I don't know. His story was not 
consistent with what the security guard testified. 
Anything else? 
MR. MACK: Well, one final thing, Judge. There's 
just — there was no testimony whatsoever that he swerved at 
these people, on round two, that he swerved. 
THE COURT: Well, the testimony I heard from the 
victim was I'm standing in front of the car. 
MR. MACK: I'm talking about the second time, when 
they're — according to the drawing, right in the middle of 
that road. 
THE COURT: They are in the road. 
MR. MACK: And he doesn't swerve toward them. He — 
THE COURT: He goes right over the top of him. 
MR. MACK: Well, legs. I mean, if he's trying to 
kill these guys, he's not — and a guy is sitting on the 
ground — 
THE COURT: Well — 
MR. MACK: I see it differently. 
THE COURT: I know we do. I know we do. And that's 
why they have appellate courts. 
MR. MACK: Well — 
THE COURT: You may be absolutely right, but I'm 
telling you how I'm seeing it. 
MR. MACK: Well, I — I know. You're the trier of 
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fact. It's — 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 
MS. COLLINS: No, your Honor. I don't feel the court 
needs to explain. The jury doesn't need to explain. 
THE COURT: What do we need to do on sentencing? 
MR. MACK: I guess get a presentence report. 
THE COURT: You waive the maximum time? 
MR. MACK: He would. 
THE COURT: Let's do it on August 17 at 9:00 a.m. 
MS. COLLINS: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. MACK: Thank you, Judge. 
(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.) 
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